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The Single-Subject Rule: A State Constitutional Dilemma
Richard Briffault
I.

Introduction
Critics of the proliferation of omnibus legislation in Congress have pointed to the

constitutions of the American states as providing an alternative, and potentially superior,
model for lawmaking.1 Forty-three state constitutions include some sort of “single-subject”
rule, that is, the requirement that each act of the legislature be limited to a single subject.
Many of these provisions date back to the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and,
collectively, they have been the subject of literally thousands of court decisions.2 Nor is
the rule a relic from a bygone era; one recent study found the rule at stake in 102 cases
in 2016 alone.3 Many of these decisions have involved controversial, hot-button issues.
In the last two decades, state courts have used single-subject rules to invalidate laws
dealing with, inter alia, firearms regulation,4 abortion,5 tort reform,6 immigration,7 local

1

See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, The Truth-in-Legislation Amendment: An Idea Whose Time has
Come, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 831 (2011); Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-inLegislation Amendment, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 957 (1999); M. Albert Figinski, Maryland’s Constitutional One-Subject
Rule: Neither a Dead Letter nor an Undue Restriction, 27 U. Balt. L. Rev. 363, 390-94 (1998).
2
See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 803, 818-22
(2006). Gilbert’s count includes cases dealing with voter initiatives. Twenty-four states provide for the voter
initiative process, and eighteen of those states require voter initiatives to comply with a single-subject
requirement. See generally Rachel Downey, Michelle Hargrove and Vanessa Locklin, A Survey of the Single Subject
Rule as Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 579 (2004). As voter initiatives pose distinctive
issues with respect to the potential value of a single-subject requirement, see, e.g., Kurt G. Kastorf, Logrolling Gets
Logrolled: Same-Sex Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single Subject Rule, 54 Emory L.J. 1633 (2005), this
article focuses largely on cases that apply single-subject requirements to acts of state legislatures, and addresses
analyses of the single-subject rule that focus on legislative enactments rather than initiatives.
3
See Daniel N. Boger, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1247, 1249 (2017).
4
See, e.g., Leach v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016); Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585
(Minn. 2005).
5
See, e.g., Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048 (Ok. 2016).
6
See, e.g., Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc., 302 P.3d 789 (Ok. 2013). State ex rel Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999)
7
See, e.g., Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251 (Ok. 2011).
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minimum wage laws,8 sex offenders,9 enhanced criminal penalties,10 and school
vouchers.11
Yet, despite having long been a part of the constitutional law of most states,12 the
single-subject rule is deeply problematic. Courts and commentators have been unable to
come up with a clear and consistent definition of what constitutes a “single subject.”
Instead, a persistent theme in the single-subject jurisprudence has been the inevitable
“indeterminacy” of “subject”13 and a recognition that whether a measure consists of one
subject or many will frequently be “in the eye of the beholder.”14 On the one hand, as the
Michigan Supreme Court once explained, “[t]here is virtually no statute that could not be
subdivided and enacted as several bills”15 On the other hand, as an older Pennsylvania
Supreme Court case put it, “no two subjects are so wide apart that they may not be
brought into a common focus, if the point of view be carried back far enough.” 16
In practice, the meaning and enforcement of the rule has usually turned on how
deferential the court thinks it ought to be to the legislature or, conversely, how much it
sees the combination of topics in a new law as reflecting the legislature’s defiance of the
norms of proper law-making. Over the past century and a half, state courts for the most

8

See, e.g., Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 2017).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013).
10
See, e.g., People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1999).
11
See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
12
State constitutions and state courts are a vital but understudied component of the American legal system.
Moreover, even when scholars turn their attentions to state constitutionalism, they tend to focus on state
analogues to federal constitutional provisions, such as those involving free speech, equality, due process, or
criminal procedure, see, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American
Constitutional Law (Oxford U. Press 2018). rather than on the legislative process restrictions that are a truly
distinctive feature of state constitutionalism.
13
See Ore. Educ. Ass’n v. Phillips, 727 P.2d 602, 612 (Ore. 1986) (Linde, J. concurring).
14
See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiative and the Single-Subject Rule, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 936, 938 (1983).
15
People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 722 (Mich. 1994).
16
Payne v. School Dist. Of Borough of Coudersport, 31 A. 1072, 1074 (Pa. 1895).
9
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part appear to have given a liberal interpretation to the concept of “single subject” and
have rejected most single-subject challenges to state legislation.17 Even with the uptick
in findings of violations in recent decades,18 the meaning of the rule remains murky, with
the case law consisting of a mix of unpredictable “I know it when I see it” decisions.19
Due to the slipperiness of subject, many analyses have focused on what are
regularly said to be the primary purposes of the rule – the prevention of legislative
logrolling and riders, and the promotion of a more orderly and informed legislative process
-- and have called for reframing the enforcement of the rule around the advancement of
these goals. But determining whether a law is the product of logrolling, or whether a
provision should be treated as a rider, will often be difficult. Moreover, it is far from clear
that logrolls and riders are as pernicious as proponents of more vigorous enforcement of
the single subject rule assume. So, too, the more aggressive use of the single-subject
rule urged by advocates as a means of thwarting “legislative chicanery” 20 and “backroom
politics”21 could also undo the cooperation and compromise necessary to get difficult but
important legislation enacted.

17

The leading study of the first century of the single-subject rule is Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More
than One Subject, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389 (1958). Professor Ruud concluded that “the one-subject rule . . . appears as
a weak and undependable arrow in [the] quiver” of anyone challenging state legislation. Id. at 447. Nearly sixty
years later, another comprehensive study similarly concluded that “most states have . . . given little weight to their
respective single subject rules. Justin W. Evans & Mark. C. Bannister, Reanimating the States’ Single Subject
Jurisprudence: A New Constitutional Test, 39 So. Ill. U.L.J. 163, 163 (2015). See also Unity Church of St. Paul, supra,
694 N.W.2d at 592 (noting that Minnesota had found only five single-subject violations148 years); Porten Sullivan,
supra, 568 A.2d at 402 (only two violations in 139 years).
18
See Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of
Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 Harv. J. Legis. 103, 106 (2001), Denning & Smith,
supra, 1999 Utah L. Rev. at 996-97.
19
Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
20
Denning & Smith, supra, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. at 832.
21
Note, Tipping Point: Missouri’s Single Subject Provision, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1387, 1389 (2007).

3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721

Part II of this article briefly reviews the history and purposes behind the singlesubject rule. Part III examines how state courts have applied the single-subject rule, with
particular attention to some recent state supreme court single-subject cases interpreting
the rule. Part IV focuses on arguments for reframing enforcement of the rule more tightly
around its purposes, particular the goals of preventing logrolling or riders. Part V
concludes by reflecting of the significance of the failure of the rule to achieve its goal of
reforming state legislative processes.
II.

The History and Purposes of the Single-Subject Rule
A. History
Scholars have traced concerns about omnibus legislation and the norm of requiring

laws to be limited to a single subject to the Lex Cecilia Didia of the Roman Republic.22
Early instances of single-subject requirements in the American setting include a complaint
by the Privy Council about the practices of the legislature of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony,23 and a 1702 directive of Queen Anne to the royal governor of the New Jersey
colony against the adoption of laws “intermixing in one Act” unrelated subjects. 24 The
constitutions -- federal and state – adopted after the Revolution did not include a singlesubject requirement. But that soon changed. The early nineteenth century witnessed
growing popular discontent with the performance of state legislatures, including such
abuses as “[l]ast-minute consideration of important measures, logrolling, mixing
substantive provisions in omnibus bills, low visibility and hasty enactment of important,

22

See, e.g., Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure: Parliamentary Practices and the Course of Business in the Framing
of Statutes 548 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1922).
23
Id. at 549.
24
Id.
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and sometimes corrupt legislation, and the attachment of unrelated provisions in the
amendment process.”25 In response, the states amended their constitutions to impose
new constraints on their legislatures. Some of these were substantive, such as limits on
state spending, lending, and borrowing intended to prevent the practices that got many
states into fiscal difficulties in the 1830s and 1840s.26 Others were procedural, and were
intended to promote legislative accountability and deliberation. These included, inter alia,
requirements that votes be reflected in the legislature’s journal; that no bill be altered
during the legislative process so as to change its legislative purpose; that bills must “age”
a certain number of days before they can be voted on; that each bill have a title clearly
disclosing its subject – and that each bill be limited to a single subject.27
Illinois was the first to adopt a single-subject requirement when it amended its
constitution in 1818 to direct that bills appropriating salaries for government officials be
limited to that subject. Michigan in 1843 limited laws authorizing the borrowing of money
or the issuance of state stock to a single object. In 1844, New Jersey adopted the first
general single-subject requirement.28 Thereafter, the idea spread quickly. Today, fortythree states, including every state entering the Union after 1844, includes some version
of the single-subject rule in its constitution, almost always in the same sentence as the
clear title requirement.29

25

Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial
Enforcement, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 797, 798 (1987).
26
See Richard Briffault & Laurie Reynolds, State and Local Government Law 639-641, 817-18 (8th ed. 2016).
27
Williams, supra, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 798-99.
28
See Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389, 389-90 (1958).
29
See, e.g., Michael W. Catalano, The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling, 3 Emerging
Issues in State Constitutional Law 77, 80 (1990).

5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721

There are some variations across the states’ constitutions in the language and
scope of the rule. Two states apply the requirement only to appropriations bills, and
another two states limit it to bills adopting special or local laws.30 Conversely, a few states
exempt appropriations bills from the single-subject requirement,31 and some states
exclude bills “for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws.”32 A handful of states
use the term “object” rather than “subject,” although that does not appear to have had any
legal significance.33 Notwithstanding these variations, some version of the single-subject
requirement is widespread, with roughly three-quarters of state legislatures subject to the
rule for most enactments. It is probably the “most significant and most litigated procedural
requirement” in state constitutions.34 The language of the Ohio Constitution is typical: “No
bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”35
B. Purposes
The purposes of the single-subject rule are briefly stated and often repeated: the
prevention of logrolling and riders; orderly legislative procedure that promotes informed
legislative decision-making and public accountability;36 and, less frequently, the
protection of the governor’s veto power.37 Logrolling and riders, in particular, have been

30

Id.
See Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 416.
32
See, e.g., Ill. Const., art IV., §8(d).
33
See Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 394-96.
34
Michael J. Kasper, Using Article IV of the Illinois Constitution to Attack Legislation Passed by the General
Assembly, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 847, 848 (2009).
35
Ohio Const. Art II, § 15(D).
36
See generally Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 390-91.
37
See, e.g., Justin W. Evans & Mark C. Bannister, The Meaning and Purpose of State Constitutional Single Subject
Rules: A Survey of States and the Indiana Example, 49 Val. U. L. Rev. 87, 151-52 (2014); In re Initiative Petition No.
382, 142 P.3d 400, 405 n. 11 (Okla 2006); Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis. at 114-15; Migdal v. State. 747 A.2d
1225, 1229 (Md. 2000); Hammerschmidt v. Boone Co., 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994); Figinski, supra, 27 U. Balt. L.
Rev. at 366.
31
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most frequently cited as the “evils” against which the single-subject rule” is aimed.38 The
two terms are sometimes blurred together,39 but they refer to somewhat different forms
of legislative action. “Logrolling” is used to describe what occurs when two or more
separate proposals, none of which is able to command majority support, are combined
so that the minorities behind each measure aggregate to a majority capable of passing
the resulting bill.40 A “rider” is a provision which could not pass on its own but is then
attached to a bill considered likely to pass and so “rides” on that more popular measure
to enactment.41
Both logrolling and riders have been sharply criticized because they lead to the
adoption of measures that do not enjoy true majority support within the legislature, and,
to the extent that legislators accurately represent the views of their constituents, within
the state as a whole. Some courts have also emphasized the degree to which logrolls
and riders interfere with the freedom of legislators by presenting them with the “Hobson’s
choice” of being “forced to assent to an unfavorable provision to secure passage of a

38

See, e.g., Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 398 (“log-rolling is the evil at which the one-subject rule is aimed”);
Stephanie Hoffer & Travis McDade, Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio’s One-Subject Rule and the Very Evils it was
Designed to Prevent, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 557 (2004). Cf. In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2005-2006
#74, 136 P.3d 237, 243 (Coats, J., dissenting) (“both case law and legislative history make clear that this provision
must be understood as directed against two specific evils: 1) increasing voting power by combining measures that
could not be carried on their individual merits, . . . and 2) surprising voters by surreptitiously including unknown
and alien subjects ‘coiled up in the folds’ of the proposal”) (application of single-subject rule to ballot proposition).
39
See, e.g., Fent v. State, 214 P.3d 799, 804 (Okla. 2009); Porten Sullivan, supra. 568 A.2d at 1116; State ex rel Ohio
AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 604 (Ohio 1994) (Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part); Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis. at 161 (analyzing a case in which it was “hard to say” whether a singlesubject violation involved a logroll or a rider).
40
See, e.g., Comm. v. Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 612.
41
See, e.g., James Preston Schuck, Returning the One to Ohio’s One-Subject Rule, 28 Cap. L. Rev. 899, 901 (2000).
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favorable one, or conversely, forced to vote against a favorable provision to ensure that
an unfavorable provision is not enacted.”42
Beyond the prevention of logrolling and riders, many courts and commentators cite
improved legislative deliberation, greater transparency, and the resulting greater
accountability to the public as purposes of the single-subject rule.43 As the Illinois
Supreme Court recently explained, one reason for the single-subject rule “is to promote
an orderly legislative process. . .. ‘By limiting each bill to a single subject, the issues
presented by each bill can be better grasped and more intelligently discussed.’”44 The
Missouri Supreme Court similarly asserted that by limiting each bill to a single subject,
the rule enables bills to “be easily understood and intelligently discussed, both by
legislators and the general public.”45 So, too, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has urged
that the general aim of the rule is to “place restraints on the legislative process and
encourage an open, deliberative, and accountable government.”46 The intuition is that
when a bill is limited to a single subject, it is easier for legislators to more fully understand
the ramifications of enactment and for the public to know what their legislators are up to.
That can facilitate public input while the measure is pending, or voter efforts to hold
legislators accountable after enactment. Supporters of the rule have also expressed the
hopeful assumption that it will “prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the

42

In re Initiative Petition No. 382, supra, 142 P.3d at 405. Accord, Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d at 1121 (“to
avoid the necessity for a legislator to acquiesce in a bill he or she opposes in order to secure useful and necessary
legislation”).
43
See, e.g., Kasper, supra, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. at 848-49; Schuck, supra, 28 Cap. L. Rev. at 903; Ruud, supra, 42 Minn.
L. Rev. at 391, 449-50.
44
Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ill. 2011), quoting Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (Ill. 1997).
45
Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 578 (Mo. 2006). See also Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d
348, 351 (Mo. 2013) (the rule “ensures that members of the legislature and the public are aware of the subject
matter of pending laws”).
46
Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund (“PAGE”) v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 395 (Pa. 2005).
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legislature”47 by barring special interest groups from hiding deals or giveaways in long
and complex multi-subject measures.
III.

The Single-Subject Rule in the Courts
A. Subject
Courts have regularly recognized the intrinsic difficulty of defining “subject” for

purposes of enforcing the single-subject requirement.

As the Utah Supreme Court

recently acknowledged, a “precise formula may well be impossible to craft.”48 Other courts
have agreed that “[f]or purposes of legislation, ‘subjects’ are not absolute existences to
be discovered by some sort of a priori reasoning, but are the result of classification for
convenience of treatment and for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose
of the particular legislative act.”49 As Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein has emphasized
a central problem is the level of specificity required or generality permitted in defining
what constitutes a subject as “any collection of items, no matter how diverse and
comprehensive will fall ‘within’ a single (broad) subject if one goes high enough up . . .
and, on the other hand, the most simple and specific idea can always be broken down
into parts, which may in turn plausibly be regarded as separate (narrow) subjects.”50
Some courts have emphasized the need to take a broad approach to defining
“subject.” The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that “there is no constitutional
restriction as to the scope or magnitude of the single subject of a legislative act.”51 The

47

Otto v. Wright Co., 920 N.W.2d 446, 456 (Minn. 2018); Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Mo.
1997) (the rule serves to “facilitate orderly procedure, avoid surprise, and prevent ‘logrolling’”).
48
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1112 (Utah 2013).
49
Washington Ass’n for Substance Abuse and Violence Prevention v. State, 278 P.2d 632, 642 (Wash. 2012
(quoting earlier Washington and Indiana courts)
50
See Lowenstein, supra, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 941.
51
Gregory v. Shurtleff, supra 299 P.3d at 1112.
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Illinois Supreme Court agreed that “[t]he subject may be as broad as the legislature
chooses,”52 albeit not “so broad that the rule is evaded as a meaningful constitutional
check on the legislature’s actions”53 – perhaps not the most helpful formula. Indeed, some
state courts have approved as constitutionally permissible subjects such broad topics as
“land,”54 “education,”55 “transportation,”56 “utilities,”57 “state taxation,”58 “public safety,”59
“capital projects,”60 and “operations of state government.”61
On the other hand, some state high courts have rejected “any broad, expansive,
approach,”62 and have ruled out certain relatively broad topics. The Maryland Court of
Appeals concluded that the purpose of “generally regulating corporations is too broad and
too tenuous” to satisfy the single-subject requirement.”63 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that “municipalities” is “too broad to qualify for single-subject status”64 and,
similarly, that “refining civil remedies or relief” and “judicial remedies and sanctions” are
“far too expansive” to satisfy the single-subject requirement65 -- although the same court

52

Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905.
Id.
54
State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).
55
Kansas NEA, supra, 387 P.3d at 808-09.
56
See, e.g., Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska. 1985); Wass v. Anderson, 2452 N.W.2d
131, 137 (Minn. 1977); C.C. Dillon v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000).
57
Kansas One-Call Sys. v. State, 274 P.3d 625 (Kan. 2012).
58
North Slope Borough v. SOHIO Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534 (Alaska 1978).
59
Townsend v. State, 767 N.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Minn. 2009).
60
Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 907 (“capital projects is a legitimate single subject”).
61
Otto v. Wright Co., supra, 910 N.W.2d at 457 (“’the operation of state government’ – is not too broad to pass
constitutional muster”). But see People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (Ill. 1999) (rejecting subject of “governmental
matters”).
62
Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Cap. Imp. Auth. (“OCIA”), 214 P.3d 799, 806 (Ok. 2009).
63
Migdal v. State, supra, 747 A.2d at 1231.
64
City of Philadelphia v. Comm., 838 A.2d 566, 589 (Pa. 2003).
65
Comm. v. Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 613.
53
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also held that the “regulating of gaming” was sufficiently narrow as to be a constitutionally
permissible subject.66
Some state constitutional provisions authorize acceptance of some inherently
broad measures, like appropriations and budget bills, codifications, and comprehensive
revisions, and some courts similarly recognized that such sweeping multi-part measures
can constitute a single subject. However, difficulties have arisen when substantive law
provisions are attached to appropriations bills67 and also in defining what constitutes a
permissible comprehensive approach. Thus, state courts have divided over whether
comprehensive tort reform constitutes a single subject. The Alaska Supreme Court, which
has generally accepted a broad definition of subject, upheld a single tort reform law that
imposed caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, required payment of half of all
punitive damages awards to the state, created a statute of repose, adopted a comparative
allocation of fault between parties and nonparties, provided for a revised offer of judgment
procedure, and gave hospitals partial immunity from vicarious liability for some
physicians’ actions.68 The court acknowledged that the law’s provisions “concern different
matters” but concluded that “they are all within the single subject of ‘civil action.’” 69 The
Ohio and Oklahoma Supreme Courts, however, rejected similar measures, finding,
respectively that “tort and other civil actions,”70 and “lawsuit reform”71 could not be
sustained as constitutionally permissible single subjects of legislation. Courts have

66

PAGE, supra, 877 A.3d at 396.
See, e.g., Rudd, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 413-47; State ex rel Ohio CSEA v. State, 56 N.E.3d 913, 919 (Ohio 2016)
(“Biennial appropriations bills, which fund the state’s programs and departments, necessarily address wide-ranging
topics”); Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585,
68
Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002).
69
Id. at 1070.
70
State ex rel Ohio Academy of Trial lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1101 (Ohio 1999).
71
Douglas v. Cox Retirement Props., Inc., 302 P.3d 789, 793 (Okla. 2013).
67

11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721

similarly struggled over the significance of the length or number of sections of a bill or the
number of articles or titles of the state code that the measure amends. Although longer,
more complex bills are certainly more likely to be found to violate the single-subject
constraint, the fact that the bill amends only a single article or title will not save it,72 and
the fact that it runs over one hundred pages, with dozens of chapters and multiple
sections, need not be fatal.73
Courts frequently acknowledge the lack of clarity in their single-subject
jurisprudence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has candidly written that its cases
indicate that “the line between what is constitutionally acceptable and what is not is often
blurred.”74 Many of the most prominent recent cases in Pennsylvania and Ohio – two
states which have witnessed considerable single-subject rule litigation -- have been
marked by sharp dissents,75 with one Ohio dissenter pointing out that in one case each
state supreme court justice authored a separate opinion demonstrating “that there was
little consensus among the justices on the rule’s meaning.”76 A dissenting justice of the
Colorado Supreme Court similarly lamented “an unmistakable lack of uniformity in our
treatment of the single-subject requirement.”77 Even when there are no dissents, it is

72

See, e.g., Comm. v. Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 612-13; Migdal v. State, supra, 747 A.2d at 1230.
See, e.g. Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905-07, Arangold v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191 (Ill. 1999) (amending
twenty-one separate laws): PAGE, supra, 877 A.2d at 392 (bill was 145 pages and included seven chapters and 86
sections). See also Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis. at 144-45.
74
PAGE, supra, 877 A.2d at 400.
75
See, e.g., Comm. v. Neiman, supra; Penn. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Comm., 64 A.2d3d 611 (Pa. 2013);
Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 2009); CSEA, supra; State ex rel Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Ass’n v.
State Emp. Rel. Bd. (“CSEA v. SERB”), 818 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 2004); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio
1999); Sheward, supra; Voinovich, supra.
76
CSEA v SERB, supra, 818 N.E.2d at 705 (dissenting opinion of Lundberg Stratton, J., joined by O’
Connor, J.).
77
In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for No 2005-2006 No, 74, 136 P.3d 237, 244 (Colo. 2006) (Coats, J.,
dissenting).
73
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sometimes difficult to find consistency in a court’s treatment of “subject.” The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, which has had a heavy docket of single-subject cases in recent years,78
has both invalidated a law authorizing a single state agency to incur debt to finance three
different projects,79 while a few years later upholding a law authorizing a different state
agency to issue bonds to finance four different projects80 -- both times without dissent.
Although the second decision sought to distinguish the first by finding the common theme
of turnpike construction and maintenance linked the multiple projects,81 the tension
between the decisions remains.
B. Germaneness
As the Oklahoma turnpike decision indicates, the question in many single subject
cases is not the definition of “subject” per se, but whether the different topics, sections,
or parts of a bill are sufficiently closely connected that they can be treated as dealing with
a single subject. As the Ohio Supreme Court put it, the rule “allows a plurality of topics”
even as it bars a “disunity of subjects.”82 Indeed, most single-subject disputes involve
laws that, as enacted, consist of multiple provisions. Courts have developed a range of
tests for determining whether the multiple parts of a bill are sufficiently related so that
when combined they constitute but a single subject, including whether they are “rationally

78

See, e.g., Matter Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 389 P.3d 318 (Okla. 2017); Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048 Okla. 2016);
Fent v. Fallin, 315 P.3d 1023 (Okla. 2013); Douglas, supra; Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251 (Okla. 2011); Nova
Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010); OCIA, supra; In re Petition No. 382, 142 P.3d 400 (Okla.
2006).
79
OCIA, supra, 214 P.3d
80
Matter of Okla Tpke Auth., supra.
81
Id. at 320-21.
82
State ex rel Hinkle v. Franklin Co. Bd. of Elec. 580 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Ohio 1991).
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related;”83 whether there is a “unifying principle,”84 “natural and logical connection,”85 or a
“common purpose or relationship . . . between the topics;”86 “whether they have a nexus
to a common purpose;”87 whether they “fairly relate to the same subject”88 or “relate,
directly or indirectly, to the same general subject and have a mutual connection;”89
whether there is a “common thread”90 or “filament”91 linking them to each other, or – from
the opposite perspective – whether they are “distinct and incongruous”92 or “dissimilar
and discordant.”93 The most commonly used judicial standard is whether they are
“germane” or “reasonably germane” to each other or to some general subject.94
Of course, as other commentators have recognized, “reasonable germaneness” is
not much more precise or determinate than “subject” itself.95 The body of law the courts
have produced as they have grappled with the question of whether the different parts of
a bill are germane to each other or to some overarching subject is not much more
consistent than the jurisprudence concerning permissible subjects.
Thus, courts have found sufficient germaneness in laws that combine a tax on
motor vehicle fuels with authorization of bonds to finance highway construction;96 add an

83

State ex rel Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Ass’n v. State, 56 N.E.3d 913, 922 (Ohio 2016).
McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 855-56 (Pre. 1996).
85
People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ill. 1999).
86
Hoover v. Bd. of Franklin Co. Comm’rs, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580 (Ohio 1985).
87
Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 612.
88
Hammerschmidt v. Boone Co., 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994)
89
Ex parte Jones, 440 S.W.3d 628, 632 (Tex. 2014).
90
Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1997).
91
Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Reg. Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 154-55 (Minn. 1989).
92
Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121 (Md. 1990)
93
Kansas Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. State, 387 P.3d 795, 805 (Kans. 2017).
94
Unity Church of St. Paul, supra, 694 N.W.2d at 593. See generally Kastorf, supra, 54 Emory L.J. at 1661
(reasonable germaneness most common test for compliance with single subject rule)
95
See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 687, 710) (“[g]ermaneness provides no clear guidance to the level of abstraction”.
96
Wass v. Anderson, 252 N.W.2d 131, 135-36 (Minn. 1977).
84
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authorization of a park district to acquire land to a bill making appropriations for state
government;97 combine an authorization of the privatization of liquor sales with funding
for public safety;98 combine provisions dealing with asbestos abatement, leaking
underground storage tanks, and water well drilling under the rubric of “environmental
control;”99 combine local regulation of billboards with funding for the state transportation
department;100 add a program for the privatization of child support enforcement to a bill
dealing with welfare reform;101 add an authorization for counties to hire private accounting
firms to audit their books to the state government finance omnibus bill;102 include
provisions regulating the sale of prisons to private operators in the state budget bill;103
and combine funding for emergency medical services with a prohibition on the use of tax
increment financing in flood plains (on the theory that the financing restriction would
reduce the need for emergency services).104
On the other hand, courts have rejected on single-subject grounds measures that
sought to combine: regulation of long-term care with authorization of the state attorney
general to enforce regulation of advertising by nursing homes;105 multiple anti-crime and
neighborhood safety provisions with provisions regulating (including but not limited to
criminal punishments for fraud) private providers of public welfare services;106 payment
of prevailing wage requirements for both publicly and nonpublicly financed school

97

Blanc v. Suburban Hennepin Reg. Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1989).
Washington Ass’n for Substance Abuse v. State, 278 P.3d 632 (Wash. 2012).
99
Corvera Abatement Tech. v. Air Conservation Com’n, 973 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1998).
100
C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 327-29 (Mo. 2000).
101
Maryland Classified Emp. Ass’n v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 942-46 (Md. 1997).
102
Otto v. Wright Co., 910 N.W.2d 446, 455-57 (Minn. 2018).
103
State ex rel Ohio CSEA v. State, 56 N.E.3d 913 (Ohio 2016).
104
City of St. Charles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 149, 151-52 (Mo. 2005).
105
Missouri Health Care Ass’n v. Attorney General, 953 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1997).
106
People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 Ill. 1999).
98
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construction and remodeling projects added to an omnibus tax relief bill;107 a ban on
persons convicted of a felony from running for elected office in the state with a general
regulation of political subdivisions including local elections;108 changes to a state’s public
utilities regulatory fund with changes in the public service commission’s rule-making
process;109 a provision relating to resident agents of corporations and a provision
governing directors of investment companies;110 and changes to the state’s workers’
compensation system with an exemption from the state’s child labor laws and provision
for an intentional workplace tort.111 There may be a principle that explains the different
findings of connection or germaneness across the cases, but it is not easy to discern.
C. Judicial Deference
Most courts have declared that they will take a deferential approach to the
legislature, adopting a “liberal interpretation” of the meaning of “subject” and of the degree
of connectedness among a bill’s parts necessary to satisfy the germaneness standard.
Reviewing the state’s case law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that “[i]n more
recent decisions . . . Pennsylvania courts have become extremely deferential toward the
General Assembly in [single-subject] challenges” and have upheld laws as long as “the
court can fashion a single, over-arching topic to loosely relate the various subjects

107

Assoc. Bldrs & Contrs. v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 2000).
Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. 2006). See also Hammerschmidt v. Boone, 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994)
(rejecting a bill that combined a provision allowing certain counties to adopt, by election, a county constitution
with a generally relating to local elections); State ex rel Hinkle v. Franklin Co. Bd. of Elec. 580 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio
1991) (rejecting combination of provisions dealing with judicial elections and local option elections).
109
Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Comm., 809 A.2d 640 (Md. 2002).
110
Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225 (Md. 2000).
111
State ex rel Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994).
108
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included in the statute under review.”112 High courts in Alaska,113 Illinois,114 Kansas,115
Maryland,116 Missouri,117 Minnesota,118 Ohio119 and other states have similarly taken the
position that they will strike down laws on single subject grounds only if the violation is
“clearly, plainly, and palpably so,” “manifestly gross and fraudulent,” or shown “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”120
The case for such a liberal, deferential approach is clear. It demonstrates respect
for a coordinate branch of government. If few, if any, laws are struck down on singlesubject grounds, it minimizes the need for the court to articulate a clear and consistent
standard for determining the meaning of “subject” or “germaneness” or to rationalize the
different treatment of different cases. And it avoids the extremely knotty question of what
to do when a law is determined to violate the rule – strike the whole law down; or sever
the section or sections not germane to the other provisions, strike those down, and sustain
the rest.121 On the other hand, judicial deference, with the resulting expansive definitions

112

City of Philadelphia, supra, 838 A.2d at 576-77.
See, e.g., Evans v. Kutch, supra, 56 P.3d at 1069 (“only a ‘substantial and plain’ violation of the one subject rule
will lead us to strike down legislation on this basis”).
114
Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905 (“we construe the word ‘subject’ liberally in favor of upholding the
legislation;” a law violates the rule only “when it contains unrelated provision that by no fair interpretation have
any legitimate relation to the single subject”).
115
Kansas NEA, supra, 387 P.3d at 808 (“the underlying policy of liberally construing the one-subject rule”).
116
Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d at 1118 (“the ‘general disposition of [this] Court has been to give the section a
liberal construction, so as not to interfere with or impede legislative action’”).
117
C.C. Dillon Co., supra, 12 S.W.3d at 327 (no violation unless the act “clearly and undoubtedly violates” the rule).
118
Unity Church, supra, 694 N.W.2d at 594 (“because of the liberal deference given to the legislature, Minnesota
courts have rarely invalidated laws for a lack of germaneness’).
119
Ohio CSEA, supra, 56 N.E.3d at 919 (“To accord deference to the General Assembly’s law-making function, we
must liberally construe the term ‘subject” for purposes of the rule”).
120
See Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis., supra, at 105-06, citing and quoting cases.
121
On the difficulty of the severability question, see Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 396-400; Dragich, supra, 38
Harv. J. Legis. at 154-63; Voinovich, supra, 631 N.E.2d at 587 (ordering severance); id. at 599-600 and 600-604
(opinions concurring in finding of single-subject violation, dissenting from remedy of severance); Comm. v.
Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 613-15 (generally rejecting severance because of “the reality that discerning the ‘main’
purpose of a piece of legislation becomes an untenable exercise in conjecture when the legislation has
metamorphosed during the legislative process to include a panoply of additional and disparate subjects”); Ohio
113
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of subject and germaneness threaten to undermine the single-subject principle and to
render a provision of the state constitution a “dead letter.”122 If the purpose of the singlesubject requirement is to reform the operations of the state legislature, it may be odd to
leave enforcement of the requirement to the legislature itself. Nor is it clear that
enforcement of the rule would be so disrespectful of the legislature. Like other process
reforms, the single-subject requirement does not limit the objects of state legislation or
the goals of state policy, but only the form of the legislation used to achieve those ends.
There would be no restriction on the legislature enacting separately those measures it
could not enact together, and many findings of single-subject violations have been
followed by just such separate enactments.123
In any event, nearly all the courts that have declared themselves committed to a
deferential, liberal interpretation of subject have at one time or another struck down laws
on single-subject grounds.124 “There must be limits”125 -- “[t]here comes a point”126 – the
courts complain, but the rule of liberal-interpretation-up-to-a-point fails to provide a very

CSEA v. State, supra, 56 N.E.3d at 920 (“the appropriate remedy when a legislative act violates the one-subject rule
is generally to sever the offending portion of the act ;’to cure the defect and save the portions” of the act do
relate to a single subject”).
122
Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d 1118.
123
See, e.g., Rev. Stat. Mo. 290.528 (H.B. 1194 of Laws of 2017), preempting local minimum wage laws, adopted in
response to the invalidation of a similar preemptive measure invalidated on single-subject grounds in Cooperative
Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 2017); Comment, It’s Still a Peanut Butter Cookie: A
Comment on Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc., 39 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 243, 262-63 (2014) (following
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s invalidation of tort reform law on single-subject grounds, governor called a special
session of the legislature which passed 23 separate bills which had been part of the invalid comprehensive
measure).
124
See, e.g., for Illinois, People v. Cervantes, supra; People v. Reedy, supra; Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372; for
Maryland, Porten Sullivan, supra; Migdal v. State; Delmarva Power & Light, supra; for Minnesota, Unity Church;
supra; for Missouri, Cooperative Home Care, supra; Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc., supra; for Ohio, Sheward,
supra; Simmons-Harris v. Goff, supra; for Pennsylvania, Comm. v. Leach, supra, Comm. v. Neiman, supra; Penn.
State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs, supra; Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra; City of Philadelphia v. Comm., supra.
125
City of Philadelphia, supra, 838 A.2d at 578;
126
Sheward, supra, 715 N.E.2d 1101.
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predictable or neutral principle, and contributes to concerns that application of the rule is
driven by the policy or political views of the judges.127
D. Some Recent Cases
A brief review of recent cases – all from the current decade – from a half-dozen
state supreme courts around the country may give a fuller sense of the difficulty inherent
in applying the rule. Although some readers – and this author – may conclude that in
some of the cases the “single-subject” question was pretty easy and that the court got it
right,128 in others the issue was far more difficult and the wisdom of the decision far more
debatable.
To begin, there are at least two cases involving what seem to be easy violations
of the rule. In 2016, in Leach v. Commonwealth,129 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
struck down a law that consisted of four substantive sections addressing: trespass for the
purpose of unlawfully taking secondary metal130 from a premises; theft of secondary metal
as an independent offense; state police disclosure of records; and standing for individuals
or organizations to challenge local gun regulations. The provisions could be linked only
if, as the legislative leaders contended, they addressed “the subject of amending the
Crimes Code.”131 Such a “subject” would pass constitutional muster only at a very high

127

See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40 J. Leg.
Stud. 333, 355 (2011) (finding that judicial ideology had a “consistent, statistically significant relationship with
judges’ votes” particularly in cases implicating “fundamental values”); Survey of the Single-Subject Rule as Applied
to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 579, 593-96 (2004); Hoffer & McDade, supra, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev.
at 569 (Ohio Supreme Court’s Sheward decision “as much a political shake-up as a judicial pronouncement”).
128
Professor Gilbert found that student coders frequently agreed with judges’ categorization of the number of
subjects in a measure. See Gilbert, Does Law Matter?, supra, 40 J. Leg. Stud. at 346, 354.
129
141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016).
130
“Secondary metal” refers to metal such as copper and aluminum or wire and cable used by utilities and
transportation agencies. Id. at 427.
131
Id. at 431.
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level of abstraction, which conceivably might have sufficed if the law was a
comprehensive revision of the criminal code, which it wasn’t. Similarly, in 2017, the
Missouri Supreme Court held in Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis132 that
a law combining “the establishment, proper governance, and operation of community
improvement districts” with a prohibition on municipalities setting a minimum wage higher
than that set by the state violated Missouri’s single-subject rule. It’s not clear what “single
subject” could have held these two parts together since the party defending the local
minimum wage ban argued only that collateral estoppel from an earlier decision barred
the city from raising the statute’s invalidity as a defense, and the court simply declared
without analysis that the minimum wage preemption was “not connected to, related to, or
germane to” the regulation of community improvement districts.133
On the other hand, two cases from Kansas and Utah dealing with laws broadly
addressing education issues reached the seemingly reasonable conclusion that they
dealt with a single subject, education. The Utah law addressed a number of education
issues ranging from the state’s school aid formula, to the funding of charter schools,
requirements regarding educational materials, teacher salaries, a number of pilot
programs, and appropriations for the pilot programs, pupil transportation, classroom
supplies, and arts education.134 Not only could many of these measures have been
enacted as separate laws, but in fact the bill was an amalgamation of what had originally
been fourteen separate bills.135 It is possible that some legislators supported some of

132

514 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. 2017).
Id. at 580-81.
134
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 118 (Utah 2013).
135
Id. at 1115.
133
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these measures and not others and, as a result, had to cast votes inconsistent with their
topic-by-topic preferences. Nonetheless, if the single-subject rule is to permit
comprehensive approaches to legislative subjects, this would appear to be such a case.
The Kansas education case, Kansas NEA v. State,136 arguably pushes the envelope a bit
more. Adopted in response to a state supreme court decision invalidating portions of the
state’s public school finance laws, the challenged law “had a sweeping scope” including
the appropriation of new state school aid, the cancellation of prior appropriations for noneducation purposes to fund the new school aid, “substantive and technical changes to the
state’s public school financing statutes,” appropriations and transfer of land to state
universities, a tax credit for businesses that contribute to organizations that provide
scholarships to low-income students, changes to high school teacher licensing
requirements,

“performance-based

incentives

for

GED

and

career

education

matriculation and enrollment at state universities,” and most controversially, changes to
the Teacher Due Process Act to remove protections from many elementary and
secondary public school teachers concerning the termination or nonrenewal of their
contracts.137 As the court acknowledged, the law contained multiple topics affecting the
operations of public schools, benefits for students, state universities, and touched many
different government agencies.138 As the lawsuit by the NEA suggests, there could easily
have been opposition to the elimination of teacher due process protections from
legislators who favor increased funding for schools. Yet, applying the “policy of liberally
construing the one-subject rule,”139 all the measures seemed germane to education and

136

387 P.3d 795 (Kans. 2017).
Id. at 798, 803-04.
138
Id. at 808-09.
139
Id. at 808.
137
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“the term ‘education’ is not so broad that it fails to limit the area in which the legislature
may operate.”140
Turning to some arguably closer cases, in Wirtz v. Quinn,141 the Illinois Supreme
Court sustained a complex, multi-part law intended to authorize and fund a massive
capital projects program. Its provisions included, inter alia, raising and reallocating the
proceeds of a range of different taxes and fees; authorizing a pilot program allowing
individuals to purchase state lottery tickets on the internet, reallocating the proceeds of
the state lottery, and directing a named state university to conduct a study of the effects
on Illinois families of purchasing lottery tickets; increasing the weight limits for vehicles
and loads, and authorizing, regulating, and taxing video gaming. On its face this would
seem to include multiple subjects. But the Illinois court rationalized that they were all
related to financing the capital program. The authorization of video gaming and of the online purchase of lottery tickets was intended to generate funds for the capital program,
and the study of the impact of the lottery on families was a response to the expansion of
the lottery program. The increased weight and load limits for motor vehicles was an offset
to the increase in motor vehicle fees and fines for overweight vehicles – which was one
of the many sources of funds for the capital program.142 The court made a plausible case
that it all hangs together, although other commentators have sharply disagreed. 143

140

Id. at 809.
953 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. 2011).
142
Id. at 904-11.
143
See, e.g., Block, Broke: The Pocketbook of Illinois and the Single Subject Rule After Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 NE.2d
899 (Ill. 2011), 37 So. I. L.J. 237, 246 (2012) (“wrongly decided,” “increased uncertainty in an already uncertain area
of law, undermined the principles underlying the single subject rule”); Apadula, State Constitutional Law – Single
Subject Rule – The Illinois Supreme Court Adopts an Irrebutable Presumption of Constitutionality for Legislation
Challenged by the Single Subject Rule, Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. 2011), 43 Rutgers L.J. 617, 634
(2013)(“render[s] the single subject rule a dead letter”).
141
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Less persuasive – to this author, at least -- are two other state court decisions that
found that substantive policy provisions tucked into budget bills satisfied the singlesubject requirement. In 2016 in State ex rel Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass’n v.
State,144 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the inclusion in the biennial budget bill of
provisions changing the law governing the terms for the privatizing of prison operations
and authorizing the operation, management, and sale of five prison facilities did not
violate the single-subject rule. The privatization of prison operations and the sale of prison
facilities would save costs and generate revenue for the state and thus fell within the
subject of “budgeting for the operation of the state government.”145 But on that theory, of
course, any law with state fiscal implications could be considered as part of the subject
of budgeting for the operation of state government – certainly, an enormous subject.
Similarly, in Otto v. Wright County,146 the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2018 determined
that including in the State Government Omnibus Finance Act a provision enabling
counties to choose to have their required annual audit performed by a CPA firm instead
of by the state auditor did not violate the single-subject rule because that was “clearly
germane to the subject of state government operations,” which was the subject of the
Act.147 Although the county audit option could potentially reduce the workload of the state
auditor, the amendment seems to be really far more about the powers and duties of
counties than the operations of state government.148
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56 N.E.3d 913 (Ohio 2016).
Id. at 922.
146
910 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 2018).
147
Id. at 457.
148
Cf. Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 580-81 (Mo. 2006) (invalidating provision of a law dealing primarily with local
governments that also applied to state elections).
145
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Finally, there is the divided Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas v.
Retirement Properties, Inc.,149 invalidating that state’s Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform
Act. The majority stressed that the law contained ninety sections that included multiple
amendments to the civil procedure code plus many new acts dealing with, inter alia
emergency volunteer health practitioners, asbestos and silica claims, mandatory seat belt
use, livestock activities liability, firearm manufacturers liability, and school discipline. 150
Without much analysis151 the majority simply concluded that the multiple provisions were
“unrelated” to each other and that “[m]any . . . have nothing in common.”152 By contrast,
the two dissenters emphasized there was a common theme: “the legislature and the
public understood the common themes and purposes understood in the legislation; it was
tort reform.”153 They also pointed out the legislature had previously enacted, without
successful single-subject objection, such broad measures as the ten-article and 368section Uniform Commercial Code, and a 78-section Evidence Code, and that the
majority’s treatment of the tort reform law would create “substantial difficulty” for the
legislature to pass “comprehensive legislation including any uniform codes that are
generally adopted among the states.”154 In their view, the “majority opinion gives little

149

302 P.3d 789 (Ok. 2013).
Id. at 793-94.
151
The majority devoted five paragraphs to the discussion of the law and the application of the single-subject rule
to it, including one that focused solely on whether severance rather than complete invalidation was a possible
remedy. Id.
152
Id. For a critical assessment of the decision and an argument that it is inconsistent with Oklahoma single-subject
precedents, see Comment, It’s Still a Peanut Butter Cookie: A Comment on Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties,
Inc., 39 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 243 (2014).
153
302 P.2d at 802.
154
Id. at 802-03.
150
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guidance”155 for distinguishing between impermissibly sweeping multi-part laws and
acceptable comprehensive ones.
A striking feature of the dueling opinions in Douglas was the Oklahoma justices’
focus on the anti-logrolling purpose often invoked to explain and justify the single-subject
rule. The majority expressly framed its analysis in light the rule’s anti-logrolling purpose.156
Without citing any specific instances of logrolling in the legislative history, the majority
concluded that in a bill with so many different sections and topics, legislators were
inevitably “faced with an all-or-nothing choice” which would require them to vote for
provisions they did not want “to ensure the passage of favorable legislation.” 157 The
dissent, however, saw the range of multiple provisions in the bill as evidence of legislative
compromise. In any complex measure, “[i]t is likely that some of the legislators who voted
in favor or the bill compromised to secure its passage.”158 But in the dissent’s view that is
a feature and not a bug as “[l]egislation requires some compromise.”159
The division in Douglas points to the possibility of anti-logrolling and the other
purposes behind the single-subject rule in providing a more workable standard than the
text of the rule itself for applying the rule, as well as the difficulties in doing so. That is the
focus of the next Part.
IV.

From Text to Purpose: Anti-Logrolling and Anti-Riders as Standards for
Enforcement

155

Id. at 802
Id. at 792.
157
Id. at 793.
158
Id. at 803.
159
Id.
156
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Like the Oklahoma judges in Douglas, many courts and commentators have sought
to resolve the intractable question of how to define “subject” by turning to the purposes
long seen as explaining and justifying the single-subject rule: prevention of logrolling and
riders, and more generally protection of the legislative process from are often
characterized as improper manipulations.160 Logrolling, in particular, has long been
condemned. Indeed, “in the United States at least, . . . this word has always had pejorative
connotations.”161 By definition, an act put together by logrolling consists of measures
which, considered individually, lacked majority support. Hence, its enactment is often
seen as inconsistent with majority rule. Logrolling has been particularly criticized for
facilitating the passage of wasteful “Christmas tree” bills and pork-barrel legislation, that
is, laws that provide concentrated benefits – typically, subsidies; tax breaks; restrictive
licensing requirements; tariffs; and roads, harbors and other highly targeted infrastructure
investments – to a small number of interests but impose broader costs on consumers and
taxpayers.162 The notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 is often cited as an example of
how logrolling enables the coalition backing the law to win benefits for its benefits for the
special interest groups promoting the tariff, at a cost to the nation as a whole.163 Some
courts, like the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals, have also
emphasized the way in which such a logroll coerces legislators to vote for provisions they
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See, e.g., Comm. v. Heiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 611-12; Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905-05; Rizzo v.
State, supra, 189 S.W.3d at 578.; Simmons-Harris v. Goff, supra, 711 N.E.2d at 214 (“logrolling . . . was the very evil
the one-subject rule was designed to prevent”); Denning & Smith, supra, 1999 Utah L. Rev. at 968; Schuck, supra,
28 Cap. L. Rev. at 901 (prevention of logrolling as the “primary and generally recognized purpose” for the singlesubject rule); Hoffer & McDade, supra, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 558.
161
William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 A.P.S.R. 1235, 1235 (1973
162
See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 51 (Cambridge U. Press 1979)
163
See, e.g., Riker and Brams, supra, 67 A.P.S.R. at 1235, citing the classic study by E.E. Schattschneider, Politics,
Pressures and the Tariff (Prentice-Hall 1935).
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do not actually support or against a provision they would otherwise support because it
has been combined with measures they oppose.164
An early application of the single-subject rule by the Michigan Supreme Court to strike
down an act that appropriated state funds for the improvement of three different state
roads is a classic example of the anti-logrolling philosophy at work. As Chief Justice
Thomas Cooley explained, the roads were
“distinct objects of legislation which might, with entire propriety, have been provided
for by separate acts, and indeed, ought to have been, in view of the care which is
taken by the Constitution to compel each distinct object of legislation to be considered
separately. These objects have certainly no necessary connection, and being grouped
together in one bill, legislators are not only preclude[d] from expressing by their votes
their opinion on each separately; but they are so united, as to invite a combination of
interests among the friends of each, in order to secure the success of all, when,
perhaps, neither could be passed separately. The evils of that species of omnibus
legislation which the constitution designed to prohibit, are all invited by acts thus
framed.”165
Despite this longstanding hostility to legislation by logrolling, modern scholarship has
recognized that logrolling – or, less pejoratively, vote-trading – may actually be socially
desirable because it recognizes that legislators have different intensities of preference for
different measures. A proposal may enjoy only minority support not so much because the
majority is actively hostile to it but rather because the majority is largely indifferent or only
weakly opposed. Logrolling allows legislators to obtain passage of the measures they
more strongly support at the modest price of voting for measures they are apathetic about
or only mildly oppose. As a result, logrolling can make more legislators better off. To the
extent legislators accurately represent the interests of their constituents, logrolling can
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See, e.g., Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251, 1260 (Ok. 2011) (expressing concern that with logrolling “many of
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A.2d at 1121.
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enhance the overall well-being of the community. Moreover, logrolling may be particularly
beneficial to certain legislative groups, particularly weaker parties or representatives of
minority ethnic groups, that ordinarily lack the votes to get the measures they care most
about passed. By being able to make vote-trading deals with some members of the
majority, there is at least some prospect they can advance some items of their legislative
agenda. Moreover, as some commentators have noted, logrolling need not involve only
pork-barrel legislation but may embrace “what are truly pure public goods, e.g., defense,
education, and the environment.”166
To be sure, there is no guarantee that logrolling will be welfare-enhancing. The ability
of a legislative minority to advance its goals through logrolling will depend on the skills,
information, and resources of the legislators.167 And the majority put together by logrolling
might still impose costs on the community as a whole that are greater than the benefits
to the logrolling coalition. But it is fair to say that there is no reason to assume that
majorities put together by logrolling categorically impose net social costs or that they are
more net costly than majorities composed of a single group.168 It is even more unlikely
that courts will be able to tell the difference.169
Of course, even if the prejudice against logrolling is mistaken, that alone might not
matter for challenging the role of a concern about logrolling in applying the single-subject
rule. The real difficulty is distinguishing improper logrolling from the deal-making and
compromises that are “pervasive” in collective bodies and “normally characteristic of
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See, e.g., Riker & Brams, supra, 67 A.P.S.R. at 1246.
169
See, e.g., Kastorp, supra, 54 Emory L.J. at 1663-65.
167

28

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721

representative assemblies.”170 Such deal-making is often a critical means for contending
groups to compromise their differences and reach a collective decision.171 Although the
Illinois Supreme Court once asserted “there is a difference between impermissible
logrolling and the normal compromise which is inherent ion the legislative process,”172 it
is not clear that’s correct. Even a close review of the legislative history behind a bill173
may not help as the question is less one of fact and more of interpretation and acceptance
of legislative practices.
As the Utah Supreme Court explained, “the line between forbidden log-rolling and
mere horse-trading may be a fine one.”174 The Minnesota Court of Appeals went further
in defending a challenged bill against the claim that it was the result of impermissible
logrolling: “If the historical nature of legislation was that every single provision of a larger
bill had to be able to pass both houses of the legislature and obtain the governor’s
signature on its own merits, little if any legislation would ever be signed into law. . . . The
practice of bundling controversial, volatile provisions with germane and less-controversial
laws is not impermissible logrolling. Rather it is the nature of the democratic process. . . .
The negotiations and the constant give and take are historical, purely legal, and purely
permissible.”175Indeed, courts have defended the “liberal” approach to interpreting the
single-subject rule as essential “to accommodate a significant range and degree of
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political compromise that necessarily attends the legislative process in a healthy, robust
democracy.”176
The concern that bills that result from logrolling somehow coerce legislators into voting
against their preferences seems even weaker than the claim that bills composed of
provisions that might not have passed on their own violates proper legislative norms.
Compromise necessarily involves votes at odds with one’s ideal position. As Professor
Dan Lowenstein crisply put it: “Most choices in life involve trade-offs.”177 Or as one
member of Congress noted in early February 2019 in explaining his vote for the bill that
prevented the recurrence of a second partial government shutdown, “When you strike a
deal you get some things you want and you get some things that you don’t like.”178
In theory, the case against riders may be stronger than the case against logrolling. By
definition, a rider is attached to a bill that already enjoys majority support so that its
backers should not have had to vote for the rider in order to get their measure enacted.
Michael Gilbert speculates that riders are more likely to result from the ability of powerful
individual legislators to manipulate rules and procedures to get their particular proposals
attached to a popular bill and to block efforts to strip the rider out. 179 In his view, riders
are always anti-majoritarian and, by definition, leave a majority of legislators worse off as
they would have preferred to vote for the bill in question without the rider.180 He would
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reframe the single-subject rule exclusively around the prevention of riders.181 Yet, in
practice, it may be difficult to distinguish a rider from a logroll. As the earliest study of the
single-subject rule found, determining whether a provision is a rider is a “troublesome
question.”182 Before enactment, a bill’s proponents may be unsure whether the measure
actually enjoys majority support or is, instead, a few votes short of passage and so is
willing to accept an amendment that brings along a few more votes. Is such a provision a
logroll or a rider?183 Assessing the provisions of an act after enactment, a court trying to
distinguish a logroll from a rider “would have to make unseemly, and possibly difficult
judgments about the relative popularity of various provisions and the motivations of the
sponsors.”184 Indeed, a close assessment of Illinois’s Wirtz decision concluded that “the
attempt to distinguish between the two [logrolling and riders] may be futile.”185 The fact
that a provision, subsequently folded into a bigger bill, did not pass on its own does not
make it a rider.186 And even critics of riders recognize that, like logrolls, they can be
socially beneficial and make net contributions to social well-being.187
Several judges taking a legislative-process-focused approach to the single-subject
rule have emphasized that the troublesome sections of a bill – whether logroll or rider –
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were added at the “last minute” or the “eleventh hour.” 188 This underscores the singlesubject rule’s purposes of making sure that legislators are able to understand and
deliberate what they are voting on measures and that the legislative process is
transparent to the broader the public to keep track of legislative action. This emphasis on
surprising late in the process additions also implies some kind of legislative chicanery that
would support a judicial decision to strike down a measure. However, many state
legislatures operate under requirements of time-limited legislative sessions.189 Some of
these are as short as twenty to thirty legislative days or sixty to ninety calendar days; 190
in four states, the legislature meets only for a limited number of days every other year. 191
Frequent amendments to pending legislation are surely a part of the legislative process
to begin with.192 But tight session limits put a lot of pressure to get the legislative business
done in a very short period and make it even more likely that there will be a rush of
amendments, combinations of previously separate measures into bigger bills, and a surge
of deal-making as the end of the legislative session approaches. From the perspective of
an idealized, orderly and deliberative legislative process, this is surely unfortunate. But,
as one Ohio Supreme Court justice observed, however “distasteful” and “ugly” the
process may be, that does not make it unconstitutional.193
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It is difficult – probably impossible – to quarrel with the goals of improved
deliberation, transparency, and accountability norms. The real issues are whether
attention to those concerns, and the logrolls and riders said to violate them, helps
determine what is a subject and when is the single-subject rule violated. There can be
logrolls and riders within a single subject, and omnibus or multi-part bills which are put
together for convenience or for the comprehensive treatment of a subject. Indeed. in at
least some circumstances, legislative deliberation, effective law-making, transparency
and public accountability may be better served by multi-part bills that comprehensively
address a complex or multifaceted problem194 as by narrower measures that address the
issues piecemeal. Improper manipulations of the legislative process – if they can be
judicially identified – may be evidence that a new law goes beyond a single subject, but
it is not clear that even a close review of the legislative process can resolve the meaning
of “subject.”
V.

Conclusion

The single-subject rule presents a paradox. It is ”part of the fundamental structure of
legislative power articulated in [the] constitution”195 of the vast majority of states, and it
reflects and seeks to promote a noble vision of deliberative, majoritarian, and accountable
law-making. But it has proven all but impossible to consistently implement, or even to
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consistently define. Although some commentators have criticized the courts for excessive
deference to the legislatures and have urged that more aggressive enforcement will
improve legislative performance, that seems unlikely to occur. The problems of subject
definition and consistent application would only get worse with more aggressive
enforcement efforts. Nor is it clear that more aggressive enforcement would affect
legislative behavior. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has taken a more stringent approach
than many other state courts and has frequently struck down laws on single-subject
grounds but the legislature continues to pass laws the court finds objectionable, leading
the court to complain of “growing weary of admonishing the Legislature for so flagrantly
violating the Oklahoma Constitution.”196
The single-subject rule’s view of relatively tidy, separate topic-by-topic deliberation
and enactment is often in tension with the coalition-building and deal-making necessary
for the legislative process to work in practice. Comprehensive, multi-topic legislation will
often be necessary, if not desirable, in order for the legislature to act at all, and a
proliferation of small, piecemeal measures that would result from the strict construction
of the single-subject rule would not improve legislative efficiency or, given the time limits
many legislatures are under, legislative deliberation.
Having been a part of the constitutions of most states for roughly a century and a half,
the single-subject rule is likely here to stay, and as a part of a state’s constitution it
deserves some respect if not active enforcement. It may be that the best approach to the
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rule is the one most states take most of the time – broad definitions of subject and
deference to the legislature, with occasional invalidation of the most egregious
combinations of seemingly unrelated subjects. This seems more justified and more likely
to occur, paradoxically, not in the large, complex omnibus measures that advocates of
the rule decry, but which may be desirable for coalition-building and for comprehensive
treatment of a subject, but in smaller laws, combining just a handful of laws or
amendments on discrete topics, which can be claimed as single subject at only the
highest level of abstraction, likely “amending the crimes code”197 or “judicial remedies and
sanctions.”198
In the end, the paradox posed by the single-subject rule is probably unsolvable. More
aggressive enforcement would disrupt the legislative process for uncertain gains, and
probably still would not generate a consistent definition of “subject” or a predictable body
of law. Complete non-enforcement would fly in the face of the requirements of state
constitutions. General deference with intermittent enforcement in the most egregious
cases – with the meaning of “egregious” left open – is what we have now and is in tension
with the rule of law values of consistency and predictability. It is probably the least bad
approach, but still unsatisfactory.
The purposes of the single-subject rule – majority rule, deliberation, transparency,
orderly procedure, public accountability – are surely desirable legislative process goals,
if not essential to legislative legitimacy. But the experience of the single-subject rule
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suggests that a judicially-enforceable constitutional requirement may not be the best way
to achieve those ends.
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